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I. Introduction
In December 2015, the Republican Party of Virginia proposed,
and the Virginia State Board of Elections approved, a “statement
of affiliation” 1 for voters to sign in order to cast their ballots for the
1.

See Virginia State Board of Elections GOP Statement of Affiliation,
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Republican Party in the Commonwealth’s primary election on
March 1, 2016. 2 The Commonwealth of Virginia is an openprimary state, which means it does not require its voters to register
by party in order to vote in a party’s primary election. 3 State law
also allows “a political party to request that voters sign a pledge or
statement of party affiliation before casting primary ballots.” 4
John Findlay, Executive Director of the Republican Party of
Virginia, characterized his party’s statement of affiliation—“My
signature below indicates that I am a Republican”—as a “very
simple nine word statement.” 5 But its purpose was undisputed: if
a voter did not sign the statement, the voter would not be
permitted to vote. 6
Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump (Trump)
opposed the statement of affiliation, arguing that it would alienate
and discourage the participation of voters previously unaffiliated
REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA. (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA.],
http://virginia.gop/vagop-statement-of-affiliation/ “The Republican Party of
Virginia’s State Central Committee (SCC) has set a reasonable threshold to
participate in the 2016 Republican Presidential Primary, signing your name to a
very simple nine word statement that reads: ‘My signature below indicates that I
am a Republican.’”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
2. See Alana Austin, Oath Required to Vote in Va. Republican Presidential
Primary, NBC29 (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.nbc29.com/story/30770194/oath-req
uired-to-vote-in-va-republican-presidential-primary (“In the commonwealth
voters do not register by a political party, but in order to take part in the March
1 Republican presidential primary voters will have to sign an oath saying they
are a Republican before casting a ballot.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
3. See Bill Bartel & Patrick Wilson, Virginia Voters Must Sign Statement
Saying They’re Republican, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://pilot
online.com/news/government/politics/virginia/virginia-voters-in-gop-primarymust-sign-statement-saying-they/article_4bea8ea7-1e97-56a8-b48f-db62c80300
f0.html (“Virginia voters do not register by party, and voting in primaries is open
to anyone. However, state law allows a political party to request that voters sign
a pledge or statement of party affiliation before casting primary ballots.”) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
4. Id.
5. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA., supra note 1.
6. See Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 486 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“Virginia
Commissioner of Elections Edgardo Cortés testified in this Court that agency
personnel added a notice that ‘[a]ny voter refusing to sign the statement form
cannot vote in this Republican Party nominating process’ in order to keep the
form consistent with earlier forms created by the SBE.”).
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with the Republican Party—voters he presumed would cast their
ballots for his campaign. 7 Three Trump supporters filed a lawsuit
in the Eastern District of Virginia in January 2016, 8 claiming
violations of their constitutional rights. 9 In that case, Parson v.
Alcorn, 10 the federal court denied the plaintiffs’ motion seeking to
enjoin the Republican Party’s use of the statement of affiliation. 11
But the Republican Party of Virginia unilaterally removed the
statement of affiliation from the ballot before the primary
election. 12 Although no longer on the primary ballot, the
7. See Jenna Portnoy, Trump’s Objections to Va. Voter Pledge are Stirring
Division in State GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/local/virginia-politics/trump-objections-to-va-voter-pledge-is-stirringdivisions-in-state-gop/2015/12/30/180c9ade-af08-11e5-b820-eea4d64be2a1_story.
html?utm_term=.4e173652eed5 (“All was relatively quiet until Sunday when
Trump launched a five-tweet screed against the Virginia party, saying it ‘is
working hard to disallow independent, unaffiliated and new voters.’ He called the
pledge a ‘suicidal move’ and referred to Republican losses in elections for
statewide offices in Virginia.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
8. See Antonio Olivo, Federal Judge Rules in Favor of Republican Loyalty
Pledge in Virginia, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/virginia-politics/federal-judge-rules-in-favor-of-republican-loyalty-oath-invirginia/2016/01/14/b3a1e1f6-badf-11e5-b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html (“The
lawsuit, filed this month in the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of three
pastors who support Trump, stems from the state Republican Party’s decision in
September to require voters to sign a ‘statement of intent’ before taking part in
the primary.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
9. See generally Complaint at 12, Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp.3d 479
(E.D. Va. 2016) (No. 3:16cv013) (praying for relief “declare the loyalty oath
violates the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution as well as
section 2 of the voting rights act and state law”).
10. See Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 501 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding
that Virginia’s law allowing a political party to require a pledge in a presidential
primary does not impose “‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of
voters”) (citations omitted).
11. See Olivo, supra note 8 (“The testimony ‘does not support the
extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction’ against including the
requirement on instructions for ballots issued on election day or absentee ballots
mailed to registered voters outside the state, [U.S. District Judge M. Hannah]
Lauck ruled.”); see also Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 501 (denying the plaintiffs’
motion for preliminary injunction).
12. See Antonio Olivo & Laura Vozzella, Virginia GOP Drops Plan for
Loyalty Pledge, But Maybe Too Late for Some Voters, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-gop-drops-planfor-loyalty-pledge-but-maybe-too-late-for-primary/2016/01/30/2c65d7a8-c79911e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html?utm_term=.83271c943c3a (detailing that
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Republican Party’s proposed pledge of loyalty revived old and
sparked new questions about the existence, protection, and
burdens of parties’ and voters’ associational rights in open primary
elections, particularly when these constitutional rights seem to
conflict.
United States constitutional jurisprudence affirms the
freedom of association for political parties and voters while also
prescribing its limits. 13 But there remain unanswered questions
regarding the constitutional protections of and burdens on
associational rights of parties and voters in an open primary. At
the center of this conflict is one mechanism by which political
parties attempt to preserve the freedom of association while still
procuring the benefits of the open primary: party loyalty pledges
on open primary election ballots.
A party loyalty pledge in an open-primary system either
protects a party’s freedom of association in an overly
accommodating primary system, or it violates unaffiliated voters’
freedom of association in a primary system that maximizes their
freedom to associate through their vote. Although some federal
courts have concluded that a party loyalty pledge in an open
primary is a constitutional means to protect a party’s associational
rights, 14 this Note disagrees with this legal conclusion and
jurisprudential trend. This Note instead concludes that a state
violates independent voters’ freedom of association when it permits
or prescribes political parties to limit voter participation through
party loyalty pledges in open primaries.
Part I provides a background on the types of primary elections
in the United States—specifically open primaries—and illustrates
the historic and modern use of party loyalty pledges in open
primary elections, focusing on the Republican Party of Virginia’s
attempted use of its party loyalty pledge in the 2016
the Republican Party of Virginia “scrapped plans to use a party loyalty pledge in
the March 1 GOP presidential primary” on January 30, 2016) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
13. See Right of Association, JUSTIA US L., https://law.justia.com/constit
ution/us/amendment-01/10-right-of-association.html#fn-642 (last visited April
17, 2018) (“The right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an
integral part of this basic constitutional freedom . . . . Of course, the right is not
absolute.”).
14. See generally Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 479.
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Commonwealth Primary Election. Part II overviews election law
and the First Amendment, explaining the unique nature of
political parties, the limitations and expansions of parties’
associational rights, and the framework by which the Supreme
Court attempts to resolve conflicts between parties and voters’
associational rights. Part III argues that the Anderson/Burdick
balancing test—the Supreme Court’s foundational framework
used to resolve constitutional controversies involving election
law—was applied incorrectly in Parson, and it recommends a new
approach to applying the test to strike down party loyalty pledges
in open primaries as unconstitutional. This Note concludes that
party loyalty pledges in open primaries constitute state action that
impermissibly burdens the freedom of association of a protected
class of independent voters and are a means not narrowly tailored
to further any of a state’s compelling interests.
II. Background
A. General Primer on Primaries
The United States Constitution assigns to state legislatures
the responsibility of determining the “times, places and manner of
holding elections” for federal offices. 15 Each state legislature has
the duty to administer its state’s primary elections, including
determining “when primary elections will be held, whose name can
go on a primary ballot . . . and who is allowed to vote in a
primary.” 16 Although there are several means by which a state
legislature can permit parties to nominate candidates for general
elections Congress and the presidency, 17 all states except for
California, Louisiana, and Washington conduct partisan party
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
16. Kristin Kanthak & Eric Loepp, Political Parties and Primaries: The
Tension Between Free Association and the Right to Vote, in LAW AND ELECTION
POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 192 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2013).
17. See Jamie Gregorian, How Primary Election Laws Adversely Affect the
Associational Rights of Political Parties in the Commonwealth of Virginia and
How to Fix Them, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 135, 142 (2007) (explaining
that while “primaries and conventions are the best-known methods of
nomination, there are other means of nominating candidates,” including firehouse
primaries, caucuses, and drawing candidates’ names from a hat).
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primary elections. 18 Each state has two types of party primary
elections: congressional primaries and presidential primaries. For
the sake of simplicity, this Note will refer to these collectively as
“primary elections” or “primaries.”
There are five general types of primary elections: “open,
closed, semi-open, semi-closed, and non-partisan.” 19 If a primary is
closed, voters that are members of a party may only vote for
candidates of the party of which they are members; if voters are
not registered with a party, they cannot participate in that party’s
primary election. 20 A semi-closed primary, like a closed primary,
does not allow for voters registered with one party to vote in
another party’s primary. 21 However, a semi-closed primary
generally allows for individuals who are unregistered voters or
registered independents to vote in the primary of the party of their
choice. 22 A nonpartisan primary features candidates that do not
run on party affiliation; instead “the top two voter-getters,
regardless of party, face each other in the general election.” 23 Only
California, Louisiana, and Washington administer nonpartisan
primary elections, and only Louisiana’s election process does not
feature a general election if one candidate receives a majority of
the primary election vote. 24

18. Kanthak & Loepp, supra note 16, at 192.
19. Id. at 192.
20. See id. at 195 (explaining that in “a closed primary state, a registered
Democrat could not decide to vote in the Republican primary on Election Day.
Instead, voters must change their party affiliation long before the day they wish
to cast their ballots”).
21. See id. (“Other states have semi-closed primary systems in which some,
but not all, voters can vote on Election Day. In those states, people who are
registered as members of one party may not vote in the primary of any other
party.”).
22. See id. (“Depending on the state, voters who are independents may
participate in any one primary, or voters who are unregistered may register and
vote in any one primary. After that . . . the voter is registered as a member of the
party associated with the primary in which he or she voted.”).
23. Id. at 194.
24. See id. at 194–95 (“Note that the top-two primary used in California and
Washington differs from the Louisiana nonpartisan primary because the top two
vote-getters in California and Washington always go to a general election,
regardless of whether one candidate receives a majority of the vote.”).
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B. The Nature, Use, Benefits, and Risks of Open Primaries

The pure open, and the semi-open, primary are the two types
of the open primary, which does not require voters to be members
of the parties for which they vote. 25 A pure open primary permits
voters to participate without disclosing their party affiliation until
they have cast their ballot; a semi-open primary requires voters to
declare their party affiliation when they request a ballot. 26 Overall,
an open primary’s defining feature is that “voters do not have to
declare their party affiliation until Election Day,” 27 either by
requesting a party’s ballot or by casting a party’s ballot.
Twenty-six states hold variations of open primaries for one or
both of the two major political parties in presidential primaries;
thirty states have variations of open primaries for one or both of
the two major political parties in congressional primaries. 28 Of
these, fifteen states conduct pure open primaries for one or both
major parties. 29
Open primaries often present benefits to candidates. Because
open primaries expand the pool of potential voters beyond
registered party members, candidates at odds with blocs of voters
in their parties or incumbents that do not wish to be held
accountable by their parties in upcoming elections often favor open
primaries. 30 For example, in 2016, Republican candidate for
25. See id. at 192 (“Primaries vary on how open or closed they are to voter
participation. Also, some states have different rules for each party. There are five
primary types: open, closed, semi-open, semi-closed, and nonpartisan.”)
(emphasis in original).
26. See id. at 193 (“There are two types of open primaries. In a pure open
primary, voters may vote in secret, so that not even poll workers know in which
primary they participated. In a semi-open primary, voters must declare their
party affiliation at the time they vote.”).
27. Id.
28. State Primary Election Types, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (July 21, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/primary-types.aspx (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
29. Id.
30. See Patrick M. McSweeney, Open Primaries Hurt the Parties, DAILY
PRESS (June 24, 2001), http://articles.dailypress.com/2001-06-24/news/010621
0533_1_primary-democratic-party-democratic-candidate (“Strange as it may
seem, the politicians who make the laws favor this open system because it greatly
reduces their accountability to the political party that originally nominated
them.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
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president Trump performed substantially better in open-primary
states than he did in closed-primary states. 31 Political
commentators speculated that Trump’s success in open primaries
was likely the result of votes from independent voters, registered
Democrats, and new voters—all made possible or more convenient
because of the use of open primaries. 32
But open primaries pose risks to parties. Like the Republican
Party of Virginia acknowledged when it introduced its statement
of affiliation for the 2016 primary election, political parties in openprimary states are at risk of unaffiliated voters affecting—if not
determining—the outcomes of their primary elections. 33 This
practice of “raiding” open primaries is not mere conjecture. 34
Examples of successful raids abound—particularly in Virginia, as
Patrick M. McSweeney (McSweeney), former chairman of the
Republican Party of Virginia, has identified. 35
McSweeney says that Henry Howell (Howell) defeated Andy
Miller in the 1977 Democratic primary because “thousands of
Republicans voted for Howell in the primary, believing that Howell
would be the less imposing candidate in the general election
contest against Republican John Dalton, the eventual winner.” 36
Similar interference occurred in the 1989 Republican primary:
although three candidates collected more than 400,000 votes, the
margin of victory was fewer than 7,000 votes and more than 30,000
votes had been cast by registered Democrats. 37 In the 1996
31. See Eric Chemi & Michael Fahey, Trump’s Big Advantage: Open
Primaries, CNBC (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/22/trumps-bigadvantage-open-primaries.html (“Political commentators noticed something
interesting early on about Donald Trump’s surprising sweep through the
Republican primaries—the mogul seems to do better in states that let almost any
voter help pick the party nominee, not just those registered to a party.”) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
32. See generally id.
33. See id. (explaining that the “‘open’ primary system has frequently
provided an opportunity for members of one party to ‘raid’ the primary of an
opposing party to assure the nomination of a candidate who would otherwise not
have won”).
34. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000) (explaining
that “raiding” is “a process in which dedicated members of one party formally
switch to another party to alter the outcome of that party’s primary”).
35. McSweeney, supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Republican primary, an estimated thousands of Democratic voters
cast votes for Republican U.S. Senate candidate John Warner—
handing him the nomination—but then voted for his Democratic
opponent, Mark Warner, in the general election. 38 In 2000,
Republican presidential candidate John McCain actively invited
Democrats and independents to vote for him in Virginia’s
Republican primary, which he won. 39
As long as open primaries exist, candidates will exercise such
strategies to benefit from open primary elections and states will
employ methods—such as party loyalty pledges—to mitigate the
risks of open primary elections.
C. The Historic and Modern Use of Party Loyalty Pledges in
Primary Elections
In open-primary systems, political parties often adopt
measures to diminish the risk of raiding and internal division
costing the party an ideal nominee and a general election victory. 40
Although their use is not widespread, party loyalty pledges can be
a mechanism by which parties attempt to limit open primary
participation to its members or unregistered voters who are willing
to publicly affiliate with the party. They currently exist in five
states that statutorily mandate open primary elections: Alabama,
Arkansas, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia (see Table below).

38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
See Alex Isenstadt, GOP Circulates Loyalty Pledge to Box Trump In,
POLITICO (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/republican-nati
onal-committee-2016-campaign-pledge-213283 (explaining that in the case of the
2016 presidential election, Trump possessed the influence and affluence to mount
an independent bid that “could be enough to sink the eventual Republican
nominee,” and that this was a consideration of the Republican National
Committee in circulating the pledge to all candidates) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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Table: States Permitting or Requiring Party Loyalty Pledges
in Open Primary Elections
Text of Statute
State
“At the option of a political party at the bottom of the
ballot and after the name of the last candidate shall be
printed the following: ‘By casting this ballot I do
pledge myself to abide by the result of this primary
election and to aid and support all the nominees
thereof in the ensuing general election.’

Alabama

Arkansas

South
Carolina

41.
42.
43.

“Should any voter scratch out, deface, or in any way
mutilate or change the pledge printed on the ballot,
the voter shall not be considered or held to have
repudiated or to have refused to take the pledge, but
shall, conclusively, be presumed and held to have
scratched out, defaced, or mutilated or changed the
same for the sole purpose of identifying the ballot; and,
accordingly, such ballot shall be marked ‘spoiled ballot’
and shall not be counted.” 41
“Party in its discretion may elect to require loyalty
pledge and its discretion may waive such requirement,
subject only to timely challenge by candidate or person
with such relationship with political party so as to
confer standing to challenge party’s action or
inaction.” 42
“The managers at each box shall require every
voter to take the following additional oath and
pledge: ‘I do solemnly swear or affirm that I am
duly qualified to vote at this primary election
and that I have not voted before at this primary
election or in any other party’s primary election
or officially participated in the nominating
convention for any vacancy for which this
primary is being held.’” 43

ALA. CODE § 17-13-8 (2018).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-301 (West 2017).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-1010 (2017).
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“The following pledge shall be placed on the primary
election ballot above the listing of candidates’ names: ‘I
am a (insert appropriate political party) and
understand that I am ineligible to vote or participate in
another political party’s primary election or convention
during this voting year.’” 44
“If the party has determined that it will hold a
presidential primary, each registered voter of the
Commonwealth shall be given an opportunity to
participate in the presidential primary of the political
party, as defined in § 24.2-101, subject to requirements
determined by the political party for participation in its
presidential primary. The requirements may include,
but shall not be limited to, the signing of a pledge by
the voter of his intention to support the party’s
candidate when offering to vote in the primary. The
requirements applicable to a party’s primary shall be
determined at least 90 days prior to the primary date
and certified to, and approved by, the State Board.” 45

Party loyalty pledges are not new. State courts have upheld
challenges to the constitutionality of party loyalty pledges—and
voter participation requirements akin to them—for over one
hundred years. 46 Of the five statutory schemes permitting the use
44. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 172.086 (West 2017).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-545(A) (2017).
46. See Robin Miller, Constitutionality of Voter Participation Provisions for
Primary Elections, 120 A.L.R. 5TH 125, at § 3 (2004) (listing past cases from
various states where the court has upheld the party loyalty pledges as
constitutional). Miller writes:
The courts in the following cases held constitutional, under either the
federal or the state constitution, a requirement that a voter, before
voting in a party’s primary election, pledge loyalty to the party.
U.S.
Jones v. Alabama, 2001 WL 303533 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (Alabama law
required primary voters to sign a poll list containing a pledge to
support the party’s nominees)
Ark.
McClain v. Fish, 159 Ark. 199, 251 S.W. 686 (1923) (recognizing rule)
Cal.
Rebstock v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 146
Cal. 308, 80 P. 65 (1905) (a voter at a political party’s primary election
must declare a bona fide present intention of supporting the nominees
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of pledges in open primaries that exist today, Alabama and
Virginia’s provisions have been legally challenged; both have
survived the constitutional scrutiny of federal courts. 47

Id.

of the party at the next ensuing election)
La.
State ex rel. Labauve v. Michel, 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430 (1908) (promise
to support party’s nominee)
N.D.
State v. Flaherty, 23 N.D. 313, 136 N.W. 76 (1912) (recognizing rule)
N.J.
Hopper v. Stack, 69 N.J.L. 562, 56 A. 1 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1903) (if
challenged, a voter is required to make an affidavit stating that, at the
last general election at which he voted, he voted for a majority of the
candidates of the party with which he is proposing to act)
Neb.
State v. Drexel, 74 Neb. 776, 105 N.W. 174 (1905) (no person shall “be
entitled to vote at such primary election until he shall have first stated
to the judges of said primary election what political party he affiliates
with, and whose candidates he supported at the last election, and
whose candidates he intends to support at the next election”)
Nev.
Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910) (voter must affirm
voter’s “bona fide present intention to support the nominees of such
political party or organization”)
Or.
Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Or. 167, 66 P. 714 (1901) (test is that the elector
“voted for a majority of the candidates of such party or association at
the last election, or intends to do so at the next election”)
S.D.
Morrow v. Wipf, 22 S.D. 146, 115 N.W. 1121 (1908) (primary law
required primary voter, on being challenged, to swear that he is in good
faith a member of the party, and that he intends to support the
principles thereof and the candidates nominated at the primary)
Wash.
State v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 P. 728 (1908) (challenged primary
election voter must make oath or affirmation that he intends to affiliate
with the party whose ballot he demands at the ensuing election, and
that he intends to support generally the candidates of that party).

47. See Jones v. Alabama, No. 00-0442-RV-L, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3909,
at *16 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2001) (finding the Alabama Democratic Party’s party
loyalty pledge to be no more than a permissible minimal burden on the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters); see also Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp.
3d 479, 497 (E.D. Va. 2016) (finding that the Virginia Republican Party’s
“statement of affiliation” did not impose a severe burden on the rights of voters
and advanced the party’s constitutional rights).
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The Virginia Republican Party’s statement of affiliation was
intended as a threshold requirement for voters to participate in the
Virginia Republican presidential primary election. 48 The notice to
the voter on the Republican Party’s primary ballots explained:
Section 24.2-545 of the Code of Virginia allows the political
party holding a primary to determine requirements for voting
in the primary. The [Republican Party of Virginia] has
determined that the following statement shall be a requirement
of your participation. Any voter refusing to sign the statement
form cannot vote in this Republican Party nominating process. 49

Virginia Commissioner of Elections Edgardo Cortés confirmed the
intent of the statement’s presence on the ballot: if a voter did not
sign the statement, the voter would not be permitted to vote. 50
Supporters of the statement said the Republican Party
designed the pledge to “prevent Democrats and wishy-washy
Republicans from choosing the party’s nominee.” 51 Opponents of
the statement, including members of the Republican Party, said
the party had “no place excluding voters from a taxpayer-funded
process and should focus instead on broadening their base.” 52 To
assuage critics, John Findlay argued the statement of affiliation
was not “an ‘oath’ or ‘pledge’ in any way” and “not targeting any
candidate, group of voters or an unreasonable barrier to voting.” 53
Instead, Findlay said that the “purpose of the statement is to build
our party and prevent Democrats from voting in the March 1st
48. Patrick Wilson & Bill Bartel, Virginia Voters in GOP Primary Must Sign
Statement Saying They’re Republican, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Dec. 16, 2015), https://
pilotonline.com/news/government/politics/virginia/article_4bea8ea7-1e97-56a8
-b48f-db62c80300f0.html (“GOP spokesman David D’Onofrio said that because
Virginia doesn’t require party registration, ‘this is a very simple and lowthreshold statement to affirm that you mean to be voting in a Republican
primary.’”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
49. See Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 487 (including the proposed form of the
defendants).
50. See id. at 486 (“Virginia Commissioner of Elections Edgardo Cortés
testified in this Court that agency personnel added a notice that ‘[a]ny voter
refusing to sign the statement form cannot vote in this Republican Party
nominating process’ in order to keep the form consistent with earlier forms
created by the SBE.”).
51. Portnoy, supra note 7.
52. Id.
53. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF VA., supra note 1.
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Republican presidential primary.” 54 In addition to ensuring only
self-identifying Republicans would participate in the party’s
primary election, the party intended to construct a Republican
voter list based on the names and contact information provided as
affirmations of the statement of affiliation. 55 As explained above,
even though the Eastern District of Virginia found the statement
of affiliation to be constitutionally permissible to survive an
injunction, the Republican Party voluntarily rescinded it.
III. Election Law and the Constitution
The Supreme Court affirms that the “freedom of association
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments includes
partisan political organization,” 56 going so far as to say the
question of a political party’s freedom of association is “well
settled.” 57 But is it well settled? This section explores current
Supreme Court jurisprudence on political parties’ freedom of
association through a four-part framework: first, the
characterization of the nature and functions of political parties and
their freedom of association; second, the limitations the state
action doctrine presents for political parties’ freedom of
association; third, the evolution and expansion of political parties’
freedom of association in notable Supreme Court cases; and fourth,
the historic resolution of the conflict between the associational
rights of political parties and independent voters. 58
54. Andrew Cain, Trump’s Va. Campaign Threatens Legal Action Against
State GOP, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.richmond.com
/news/virginia/government-politics/article_b289d3fe-e438-5941-85a1-1cd3c6
138b43.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
55. See id. (“Findlay also asserted: ‘The fact is the Democrats are terrified
that our new statement will give us an opportunity to develop a large statewide
voter list for future party building.’”).
56. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (holding
that Connecticut’s closed primary statute interfered with a political party’s right
to define its associational boundaries).
57. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)
(holding that a ban on primary endorsements by a political party violates the first
and fourteenth amendments).
58. See Nathaniel Persily, Toward A Functional Defense of Political Party
Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 764 (2001) (“In most cases dealing with the
freedom of expressive association, the inquiry requires both characterizing the
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A. The Unique Nature of Political Parties

Political parties are traditionally characterized as private
organizations deserving of First Amendment protections against
the State. 59 Professor Daniel H. Lowenstein (Professor
Lowenstein), an expert in election law, reasons that if a political
party is a private organization, “it follows that a party and its
members, like other private organizations and their members,
enjoy the First Amendment right of freedom of association.” 60
Because “the First Amendment is centrally concerned with
protection of political speech and association, the constitutional
right of freedom of association enjoyed by a political party is
especially strong in comparison with the rights of nonpolitical
groups.” 61 Since a political party’s freedom of association is
grounded in a constitutional right “it follows that any substantial
infringement of this freedom by government is unconstitutional
unless the infringement is the least restrictive means by which a
compelling state interest can be served.” 62
But political parties are also unlike nearly all other private
organizations. 63 Parties assume different forms dependent upon
their different functions, and each form deserves a unique
constitutional protection. 64 A party’s form is determined by its
organization that claims the right and explaining how the law will affect
organizational membership so as to burden severely the organization’s
expression.”).
59. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political
Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1745 (1993) (“The doctrinal
argument against regulation of political parties is simply, and within the
conventional First Amendment framework, nearly irresistible. Its starting point,
and only sticking point, is the premise that a political party is a private
organization.”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1745–46.
62. Id. at 1746.
63. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (E.D. Cal.
1997) (“[T]he analogy between the political parties and the myriad of private
political, charitable, recreational, educational or religious associations at the
center of American life, is imperfect at best.”).
64. See Lowenstein, supra note 59, at 1760 (“[T]he things parties do are done
by different groups of people, varying enormously in number and in their relations
with one another. In short, there is no simple way to describe what a party is, and
the term ‘party’ can be and is used with greatly disparate referents.”).
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function—whether it is public, private, or a combination of the
two. 65 A party’s function may be classified on a spectrum between
how much a party—independent of the government—manages its
affairs to influence the government, and how much a
government—dependent on the authority of parties—implements
and enforces laws to influence the parties. 66
Renowned political scientist and professor V.O. Key identifies
three forms of the modern political party: “party-in-thethe
“party-in-the-government,” 68
and
the
electorate,” 67
69
professional political group. For example, a “reference to ‘the
Republicans’ or ‘the Democrats’ may refer to loyalties, affiliations,
or voting tendencies among the electorate; to partisan-based
structures and activities of elected officials; or to hierarchical party
administrative structures consisting of persons who are not elected
officials.” 70 Ultimately, the key distinction between political
parties and all purely private associations is that “political parties
routinely, pervasively, and legitimately exercise their influence
from within the government.” 71
This inherent, important public function of political parties
frustrates the application of conventional constitutional doctrinal
65. See generally id. at 1747–48 (discussing how past writers have classified
a party or their activities as “public” or “private”).
66. See id. at 1756 (explaining that “it [is] reasonable to say that when the
government ‘regulates’ the parties, to a very large extent the parties are
regulating themselves,” and that it “may be argued that the parties are no
different in this regard from other private sector groups or that if they are, the
difference is merely one of degree”); see also id. at 1759–60 (describing that “a
political party is not something occupies a particular space at a particular time or
that can be discerned with the senses” and that “there is no simply way to describe
what a party is, and the term ‘party’ can be and is used with greatly disparate
referents”).
67. See V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 164 (1964)
(“Within the body of voters as a whole, groups are formed of persons who regard
themselves as party members . . . . Party in this sense of the ‘party-in-theelectorate’ is an amorphous group, yet it has a social reality.”).
68. See id. (explaining that “[a]t times party denotes groups within the
government,” namely government officials “which could be held accountable for
the conduct of the government”).
69. See id. (referring to “the group of more or less professional political
workers” who “do the work of the political organization” more or less “separate
and apart from the party-in-the-electorate, but not necessarily independent of it”).
70. Lowenstein, supra note 59, at 1764.
71. Id. at 1758 (emphasis added).
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analysis to First Amendment claims. 72 Professor Lowenstein
argues the public functions of parties render a conventional
doctrinal framework “inadequate for properly analyzing the
relationship between parties and the government.” 73 He takes the
view that political parties are state actors, not independent private
organizations. 74 In fact, he says, parties’ major interactions with
the government “are not as objects of government actions. To the
contrary, parties operate upon, and actually constitute, the
government.” 75 For example, any state statute is enacted by
politicians “who have been elected to office as Republicans or
Democrats, who in most instances have organized their legislative
houses as Republicans and Democrats, and whose activities and
decisions occur in a formal and informal structure fundamentally
influenced by the fact that they are Republicans and Democrats.” 76
In sum, the unique purpose, functions, and activities of political
parties make them unlike any other private organization
possessing associational rights—their actions may be subject to
constitutional scrutiny.
B. Constitutional Limitations on the Associational Rights of
Political Parties
The foundation of understanding the constitutional rights and
limitations of political parties is the unique nature and public
function of political parties—and the conclusion that they are state
actors. This subpart will introduce the state action doctrine—
through the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the White Primary
Cases—and demonstrate how political parties’ administration of
primary elections is state action subject to constitutional scrutiny.

72. See id. at 1758–59 (“Conventional constitutional doctrine, because of its
preoccupation with the state’s output—its active operations on the private
sector—has been unable to take into account the parties’ domination from within
of the state and its policies, which is much the more important relationship
between parties and the state.”).
73. Id. at 1756.
74. Id. at 1759.
75. Id. at 1756.
76. Id.
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1. Introduction to State Action Doctrine: The White Primary Cases
State action doctrine fundamentally limits a political party’s
right to association. 77 As a private organization, a political party
will not invoke a court’s constitutional scrutiny of its methods of
internal regulation unless its activities constitute state action. 78 In
general, state action will only be found when: “(1) the actor is an
agent of the government;” (2) the actor performs a function
“traditionally exclusively reserved to the State;” or (3) the
government “jointly participates” with the private actor.” 79 A brief
survey of Supreme Court case law applying the state action
doctrine to constitutional questions in primary election
controversies demonstrates this.
The White Primary Cases constitute the Supreme Court’s
seminal jurisprudence on whether primary elections can be state
action. 80 In particular, the White Primary Cases demonstrate that
primary elections or pre-election processes “may possess all three
qualifications for state action and certainly would satisfy at least
one of them.” 81 Thus, the White Primary Cases provide helpful
factors to consider when deciding whether a political party’s
actions—including the enforcement of a party loyalty pledge—
within an open-primary system constitute state action and thus
ought to be subject to constitutional review. 82 A brief overview of
the White Primary Cases is required to evaluate parties’ attempts
to preserve and protect their freedom of association within openprimary systems.

77. See generally Persily, supra note 58, at 754–55.
78. See generally id.
79. Id. at 759.
80. Kanthak & Loepp, supra note 16, at 192.
81. Persily, supra note 58, at 760.
82. See id. at 755 (“The White Primary Cases have provided a template for
characterizing primary elections as state action and for setting constitutional
limits on parties’ power to define the bounds of their membership.”).

582

24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.563 (2018)
a. Nixon v. Herndon: A State’s Administration of Primary
Elections is State Action

Nixon v. Herndon 83 is the first of the White Primary Cases.
The plaintiff, L.A. Nixon, was an African-American citizen of the
United States and the state of Texas, and a resident of El Paso. 84
Although otherwise legally qualified to vote in the Democratic
Primary election, 85 a Texas statute—Article 3093a 86—prohibited
African-Americans from voting in the Texas Democratic Party
primary elections. 87 In 1927, the Supreme Court of the United
States struck down Article 3093a under the Fourteenth
Amendment, reasoning: “States may do a good deal of classifying
that it is difficult to believe rational, but there are limits.” 88
Because the Texas Democratic Party’s unconstitutional exclusion
of African-Americans was statutorily imposed, it was
unquestionably state action:
While that mandate was in force, the Negro was shut out
from a share in primary elections, not in obedience to the
will of the party speaking through the party organs, but
by the command of the State itself, speaking by the voice
of its chosen representatives. At the suit of this petitioner,
the statute was adjudged void as an infringement of his
rights and liberties under the Constitution of the United
States. 89
Herndon stands for the principle that when literal state action
regulating primary elections violates the constitutional rights of
individual voters, the government’s action will be subject to
83. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding that Texas’
white primary statute violated the fourteenth amendment because the statute
discriminated against African Americans because of color alone).
84. Id. at 539.
85. Id.
86. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) art. 3107, repealed by Acts 1985, 69th Leg.,
ch. 480 § 26(1) (1985). This law was designated as Article 3093a. See Herndon,
273 U.S. at 540 (“[T]he denial was based upon a Statute of Texas enacted in May,
1923, and designated Article 3093a.”).
87. See Herndon, 273 U.S. at 540 (describing Texas Article 3093a as
legislating: “in no event shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic
party primary election held in the State of Texas”).
88. Id. at 541.
89. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 81 (1932).
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constitutional review. Government action of this type is the most
express form of state action.
b. Nixon v. Condon: A Political Party’s State-Delegated
Administration of Primary Elections is State Action
Nixon v. Condon, 90 the second of the White Primary Cases,
was decided six years after Herndon. In Condon, Nixon attempted
to vote in another Texas Democratic Party primary election and
was again denied a ballot. 91 In response to the Court’s decision in
Herndon, the Texas legislature repealed Article 3093a but replaced
it with a new statute granting each political party’s State
Executive Committee the authority and discretion to prescribe
membership qualifications:
[E]very political party in this State through its State
Executive Committee shall have the power to prescribe
the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own
way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise
participate in such political party; provided that no person
shall ever be denied the right to participate in a primary
in this State because of former political views or
affiliations or because of membership or non-membership
in organizations other than the political party. 92
Granted this newfound statutory authority, the State Executive
Committee of the Democratic Party “adopted a resolution ‘that all
white democrats who are qualified under the constitution and laws
of Texas . . . be allowed to participate in the primary elections.’” 93
Thus, when Nixon “presented himself at the polls and requested
that he be furnished with a ballot” the judges of the election
declined “on the ground that the petitioner was a Negro and that

90. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (holding that the decisions
of a party’s state executive committee qualify as state action when the committee
is exercising power granted to it by the state legislature).
91. See id. at 81 (“This is not the first time that [the petitioner] has found it
necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts in vindication of
privileges secured to him by the Federal Constitution.”).
92. Id. at 82.
93. Id.

584

24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.563 (2018)

by force of the resolution of the Executive Committee only white
Democrats were allowed to be voters at the Democratic primary.” 94
Unlike the State’s independent, express statutory exclusion of
African-American voters in Herndon, the scheme under review in
Condon was the Texas Democratic Party’s exclusion of
African-American voters under the authority granted to it by the
State. 95 In reviewing the Texas Democratic Party’s resolution
under state law, the Court distinguished Condon from Herndon by
explaining that the test for finding state action “is not whether the
members of the Executive Committee are the representatives of
the State in the strict sense in which an agent is the representative
of his principal.” 96 Instead, the “test is whether they are to be
classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and in
such a sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits
to their action.” 97
Applying this test, the Court determined that the decisions
made by State Executive Committee, under the statutory
authority granted by the State of Texas, qualified as state action. 98
The Court held:
The pith of the matter is simply this, that when those agencies
are invested with an authority independent of the will of the
association in whose name they undertake to speak, they
become to that extent the organs of the State itself, the
repositories of official power. They are then the governmental
instruments whereby parties are organized and regulated to the
end that government itself may be established or continued.
What they do in that relation, they must do in submission to the
mandates of equality and liberty that bind officials
everywhere. 99

94. Id.
95. See id. at 85 (“Power so intrenched is statutory, not inherent. If the State
had not conferred it, there would be hardly color of right to give a basis for its
exercise.”).
96. Id. at 89.
97. Id.
98. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 658 (1944) (explaining that the
Condon Court “reversed the dismissal of the suit for the reason that the
Committee action was deemed to be state action and invalid as discriminatory
under the Fourteenth Amendment”).
99. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932).
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In short, the government cannot delegate the administration of
state functions to a private organization and not be ultimately
responsible for the organization’s actions if those actions violate
constitutional law. 100 The scheme struck down in Condon
represents state action comprising a private actor acting on behalf
of the government, and the government acting jointly with a
private actor.
c. Smith v. Allwright: A Political Party’s Administration of
Primary Elections is State Action
The Court’s reasoning and holding in Condon were affirmed in
1944 in Smith v. Allwright, 101 the third of the White Primary
Cases. In contrast to the state-mandated racial discrimination in
Herndon and state-permitted racial discrimination of Condon,
Smith presented an altogether different question: whether a
political party’s independent discriminatory membership
requirements constituted state action. 102
In Allwright, the petitioner—an African-American citizen of
the United States and the State of Texas—was refused a ballot and
a vote in the 1940 Texas Democratic Party primary election. 103 The
state Democratic Party’s refusal was predicated on its
resolution, 104 adopted on May 24, 1932: “Be it resolved that all
white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under
the Constitution and laws of the State shall be eligible to
membership in the Democratic party and, as such, entitled to
100. See id. (“The pith of the matter is simply this, that when those agencies
are invested with an authority independent of the will of the association in whose
name they undertake to speak, they become to that extent the organs of the State
itself, the repositories of official power.”).
101. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (holding that the Texas’
Democratic Party’s rule conferring membership, and therefore the right to vote in
primary elections, on only white citizens was covered by the state action doctrine
and therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
102. See id. at 662 (“We are thus brought to an examination of the
qualifications for Democratic primary electors in Texas, to determine whether
state action or private action has excluded Negroes from participation.”).
103. See id. at 650–51 (describing the cause of action that led to the granting
of certiorari).
104. See id. at 657 (“It was by virtue of this resolution that the respondents
refused to permit the petitioner to vote.”).
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participate in its deliberations.” 105 The Democratic Party of Texas
defended its resolution on the ground that it was a “voluntary
organization with members banded together for the purpose of
selecting individuals of the group representing the common
political beliefs as candidates in the general election.” 106 Arguing
it was an independent, voluntary political organization, the party
claimed it was “free to select its own membership and limit to
whites participation in the party primary” since primaries are
“political party affairs, handled by party, not governmental,
officers.” 107 Furthermore, the party claimed, the Fourteenth,
Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments were “applicable only to
general elections where governmental officers are actually
elected,” not to primary elections since “officers of government
cannot be chosen at primaries.” 108
In response, the Court affirmed that a political party generally
possesses the right to determine membership requirements as a
necessary element of the freedom of association. 109 The State has
the right to “conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she
may deem wise” within the constraints imposed by the
Constitution. 110 But the Court reasoned that when party
membership is a requirement to vote in a primary election, and
when “primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing
officials, state and national, as they have here, the same tests to
determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should
be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election.” 111
This landmark characterization of primary elections extended
the Court’s conclusion in United States v. Classic: 112 Section IV of
105. Id. at 656–57.
106. Id. at 657.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 664 (“The privilege of membership in a party may be . . . no
concern of a State.”).
110. See id. (“Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as
she may deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of
the United States Constitution or in conflict with powers delegated to and
exercised by the National Government.”).
111. Id.
112. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (holding that “a
primary election . . . is an election within the meaning of the constitutional
provision and is subject to congressional regulation as to the manner of holding
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Article I of the Constitution “authorized Congress to regulate
primary as well as general elections ‘where the primary is by law
made an integral part of the election machinery.’” 113 Because
primary elections and general elections were considered state
functions requiring constitutional protections, the Court affirmed
the fundamental right to vote in primary elections: “It may now be
taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary for the
nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like
the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the
Constitution.” 114
Allwright represents the instances when state action takes the
form of a private actor performing a function traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State. 115 Because the Court construed
primary elections as state functions requiring constitutional
scrutiny, a political party’s operation of the State’s primary
election could be characterized as state action. 116 In other words,
while “no state law directed such exclusion,” the Court “pointed out
that many party activities were subject to considerable statutory
control.” 117
d. Terry v. Adams: A Private Organization’s Administration of
Primary Elections is State Action
Terry v. Adams 118 is the fourth and final of the White Primary
Cases. The Jaybird Association—a private political organization—
it”).
113. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 659–60 (1944) (quoting Classic, 313
U.S. at 318).
114. Id. at 661–62 (citations omitted).
115. See id. (describing how primary elections are operated by private actors
even though elections generally are traditional state functions).
116. See id. at 660 (“[T]he recognition of the place of the primary in the
electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix
the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may
make the party’s action the action of the State.”); see also id. at 663 (“The party
takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state
statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are
performed by a political party.”).
117. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 462 (1953).
118. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468–70 (1953) (holding that a white
only “Jaybird primary,” where candidates were pre-selected to run in the official
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managed a Texas county’s elections independent of the local
government, and it excluded qualified African-American voters
from participating in the county’s elections. 119 The Jaybird
Association argued that because it managed elections outside of
state regulation, its discriminatory acts were not state action and
could not violate the Fifteenth Amendment. 120 The Court
disagreed, holding that the scheme “produce[d] the equivalent of
the prohibited election” 121 and explained:
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes
is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the
purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment. The use of the countyoperated primary to ratify the result of the prohibited election
merely compounds the offense. It violates the Fifteenth
Amendment for a state, by such circumvention, to permit within
its borders the use of any device that produces an equivalent of
the prohibited election. 122

Although the Jaybird Association was not a political party under
direct state regulation, it effectively took on state functions by
being the sole manager of Fort Bend County’s elections. 123 Thus,
its actions constituted state action as it performed a function
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.

Democratic primary, had become an integral part of Texas’ electoral process and
therefore violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
119. See id. at 465 (discussing the Jaybird Association). The Court stated that:
The district court found that the Jaybird Association was a political
organization or party; that the majority of white voters generally abide
by the results of its primaries and support in the Democratic primaries
the persons endorsed by the Jaybird primaries; and that the chief
object of the Association has always been to deny Negroes any voice or
part in the election of Fort Bend County officials.
Id.
120. See id. at 462–63 (“Jaybirds deny that their racial exclusions violate the
Fifteenth Amendment. They contend that the Amendment applies only to
elections or primaries held under state regulation, that their association is not
regulated by the state at all, and that it is not a political party but a self-governing
voluntary club.”).
121. Id. at 469.
122. Id.
123. See id. (“The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the
only effective part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and
govern in the county.”).
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2. Primary Elections, and a Political Party’s Efforts to Administer
Them, Are State Action
The White Primary Cases—and current primary election laws
and regulations—establish that “primaries may possess all three
qualifications for state action and certainly would satisfy at least
one of them.” 124 First, primary elections can constitute state action
“regardless of whether party organizations themselves constitute
state actors” because the elections are run “by the government to
serve governmental interests.” 125 Second, primary elections can
constitute state action because even “if the party organization,
rather than the state, operates the primary, the function it
performs—namely, the administration of an election—is one
‘traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.’” 126 Third, primary
elections can constitute state action because “the extensive
regulatory scheme for primary elections amounts to state
endorsement, encouragement, and entanglement, and thus, state
action.” 127
By holding that a party’s primary elections unequivocally
constitute state action, the Court established that a party
conducting primaries must “conform to constitutional
requirements in its treatment” of voters, and the party doing so
generally lacks the protection of the Bill of Rights against the
State. 128 This characterization of primary elections—and a party’s
actions to administer primary elections—as state action is a vital
part of the consideration of the constitutionality of party loyalty
pledges in open primary elections. After all: party loyalty pledges
in open primaries are either a constitutional means for parties to
124. Persily, supra note 58, at 760.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 761.
127. Id. at 762.
128. Lowenstein, supra note 59, at 1748. Lowenstein further writes:
[T]he public/private distinction is generally perceived as governing not
only whether an entity must conform to constitutional requirements in
its treatment of others, but also whether the entity itself enjoys
constitutional rights against the government. Thus, by declaring
parties to be ‘public,’ the White Primary Cases not only prohibited them
from depriving racial minorities of the right to vote but also seemed to
deprive the parties of the protections of the Bill of Rights.
Id.
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protect its right to association or they are an unconstitutional
burden on voters’ right to association. 129 This conflict will be
further informed by the next subpart, which surveys the Court’s
evolutionary and expansive development of the associational
rights of political parties.
3. The Evolution and Expansion of the Associational Rights of
Political Parties
A political party “has a right to ‘identify the people who
constitute the association.’” 130 A political party’s members have the
right to “determine for themselves with whom they will associate,
and whose support they will seek, in their quest for political
success” because such a determination is “undeniably central to
the exercise of the right of association.” 131 And in no area is the
political party’s right to exclude more important than in the
process of selecting its nominee. 132 When a party’s members’
associational rights conflict with the associational rights of nonmember voters, the Supreme Court has historically sided with the
interests of the party’s members over the rights of non-member
voters. 133 The Supreme Court has steadily refined and reaffirmed
this core tenant of First Amendment jurisprudence through
several landmark cases in the last half-century.

129. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 653 n.6 (1944) (highlighting that
the loyalty pledge appears to be a morally rather than a legally enforceable
pledge).
130. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)
(quoting Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
131. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
132. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (1986) (“That
process often determines the party’s positions on the most significant public policy
issues of the day, and even when those positions are predetermined it is the
nominee who becomes the party’s ambassador to the general electorate in winning
it over to the party’s views.”).
133. See generally Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976)
(rejecting a claim that Connecticut’s closed-primary system is unconstitutional),
summarily aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
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a. Nader v. Schaffer: The Constitutionality of Closed Primaries
In 1976, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the
Connecticut District Court’s decision in Nader v. Schaffer. 134 The
case featured a group of unregistered voters that refused to
register as members of a political party but, contrary to the
provisions of state law, still desired to participate in Connecticut’s
primary election. 135 The group’s complaint against the defendant
Secretary of State asserted three causes of action, one of which
notably alleged:
[C]ompelling them either to enroll in a political party or forego
a right to vote in a primary election impermissibly forces
plaintiffs to choose between a right to vote, on the one hand, and
the right freely to associate for the advancement of political
ideas, on the other; the latter includes the right to associate
with a particular candidate regardless of the candidate’s party
affiliation. 136

The plaintiffs furthered two arguments: first, that “participation
in a primary election is an exercise of the constitutionally protected
right to vote and of the constitutionally protected right to associate
with others in support of a candidate”; 137 second, that in addition
to the right to associate “there is a constitutionally protected
correlative right not to associate, and to be free from coerced
associations.” 138
The district court held that “in order to protect party members
from ‘intrusion by those with adverse political principles,’ and to
preserve the integrity of the electoral process, a state may
legitimately condition one’s participation in a party’s nominating

134. See Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 850 (D. Conn. 1976) (holding
that the Connecticut election laws governing the primaries are not in violation of
the Constitution of the United States, that they provide for legitimate goals
through constitutionally permissible means, and that there is no need or occasion
for the judicial relief requested by the plaintiffs).
135. See id. at 840 (“Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 9-431 provides in pertinent part:
‘Eligibility to vote at primary. No person shall be permitted to vote at a primary
of a party unless he is on the last completed enrolment list of such party in the
municipality or voting district . . . .’”).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 842.
138. Id.
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process on some showing of loyalty to that party . . . .” 139 In support
of this holding, the court affirmed the nature of a political party as
a “voluntary association, instituted for political purposes, with the
goal of effectuating the will of its members.” 140 Because of a party’s
nature and purpose, the “constitutionally protected associational
rights of its members are vitally essential to the candidate
selection process,” 141 deserving “affirmative protection” from the
courts. 142 The court admitted that an “attempt to interfere with a
party’s ability so to maintain itself is simultaneously an
interference with the associational rights of its members.” 143 In
this conflict of constitutional rights between party members and
non-members, the “rights of party members may to some extent
offset the importance of claimed conflicting rights asserted by
persons challenging some aspect of the candidate selection
process.” 144
The plaintiffs argued the statute constituted state action and
infringed on fundamental liberties, and that the court should apply
a heightened level of scrutiny of review. 145 The Connecticut
District Court disagreed, ultimately balancing the association
rights of party members with the association and voting rights of
non-members: “Not every limitation or incidental burden on the
exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of
review.” 146 More specifically, a “state statute or policy must cause
more than a minimal infringement of First Amendment rights
before a state is called upon to provide a ‘compelling interest’
justification.” 147 In this case, the court did not identify more than
minimal infringement, explaining that “enrollment in Connecticut
imposes absolutely no affirmative party obligations on the voter,
139. Id. at 847.
140. Id. at 844.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 845.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 844 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)) (“The
State, plaintiffs assert, may not force them to comply with § 9-431 unless the State
establishes that it ‘serves a compelling state interest by the least drastic means
available.’”).
146. Id. at 848 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
147. Id. at 848–49.
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in terms of time or money, and it does not even obligate him to vote
for the party’s positions or candidates or to vote at all.” 148 This lack
of “coerced orthodoxy imposed by government officials” 149 caused
the court to side with the party members’ freedom of association to
exclude unwanted participants from their primary election. 150
Nader represents the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the
constitutionality of a closed primary—the primary election scheme
in which only members of a party may legally vote for candidates
of their respective party. 151 In sum, a political party’s associational
rights permit the categorical exclusion of non-members from
primary election participation so long as the barriers to and
obligations of party membership only minimally infringe the
voter’s freedom of association with the party.
b. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin: Parties’ Rules Prevail
Against a State’s Primary Election Scheme
In 1981, the Supreme Court considered whether the State of
Wisconsin could insist that its delegates to the Democratic
National Convention be seated, even though the delegates were
chosen through an open primary. 152 The national Democratic
Party’s rules, which prescribed that the Democratic National
Convention delegates be chosen through procedures in which only
Democrats could participate, 153 directly conflicted with Wisconsin’s
open-primary process, which allowed “non-Democrats—including
148. Id. at 843.
149. Id. at 844.
150. See id. (distinguishing a fact from the cases plaintiffs cite to support their
primary argument, from a fact in the current case, and noting the materiality of
that fact to present freedom of association inquiry).
151. See id. at 850 (finding constitutional the statute that stated voters were
not eligible to vote in a primary unless the voters were on the last completed
enrollment list of the party in the municipality or the voting district).
152. See Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 109 (1981) (“The
question on this appeal is whether Wisconsin may successfully insist that its
delegates to the Convention be seated, even though those delegates are chosen
through a process that includes a binding state preference primary election in
which voters do not declare their party affiliation.”).
153. See id. (“The Charter of the appellant Democratic Party of the United
States . . . provides that delegates to its National Convention shall be chosen
through procedures in which only Democrats can participate.”).
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members of other parties and independents—to vote in the
Democratic primary without regard to party affiliation and
without requiring a public declaration of party preference.” 154 The
national Democratic Party did not challenge Wisconsin’s openprimary process, conceding the State’s interests for conducting
open primary elections. 155 Rather, the party challenged
Wisconsin’s requirement that the party be bound by the results of
the open primary election. 156
The Court clarified the issue on appeal by explaining the
question presented was not “whether Wisconsin may conduct an
open primary election if it chooses to do so, or whether the National
Party may require Wisconsin to limit its primary election to
publicly declared Democrats.” 157 Instead the Court said the
question was whether “once Wisconsin has opened its Democratic
Presidential preference primary to voters who do not publicly
declare their party affiliation, it may then bind the National Party
to honor the binding primary results, even though those results
were reached in a manner contrary to National Party rules.” 158
Although the Court readily admitted that “[n]either the right to
associate nor the right to participate in political activities is

154. Id. at 110–11.
155. See id. at 124–25 (discussing whether the State has compelling interests
that justify the imposition of its will upon the appellants). The Court writes:
The State asserts a compelling interest in preserving the overall
integrity of the electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot,
increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing
harassment of voters. But all those interests go to the conduct of the
Presidential preference primary—not to the imposition of voting
requirements upon those who, in a separate process, are eventually
selected as delegates.
Id.
156. See id. at 121 (discussing whether the State has compelling interests that
justify the “open” feature of the state primary election law). The Court continues:
For the rules of the National Party do not challenge the authority of a
State to conduct an open primary, so long as it is not binding on the
National Party Convention. The issue is whether the State may compel
the National Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way that violates
the rules of the Party.
Id.
157. Id. at 120.
158. Id.
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absolute,” 159 the Court explained that this right “necessarily
presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the
association, and to limit the association to those people only.” 160
Ultimately, the Court concluded the National Party’s interest to
preserve its freedom of association was not in conflict with the
State’s interest “in the manner in which its elections are
conducted.” 161
The Court held that “a State, or a court, may not
constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of the Party.
A political party’s choice among the various ways of determining
the makeup of a State’s delegation to the party’s national
convention is protected by the Constitution.” 162 Democratic Party
of United States v. Wisconsin163 does not hold that the
open-primary process is unconstitutional; to the contrary, it
reaffirms the State’s interest in conducting open primary elections
while ruling that the party is not required to be bound by the
State’s primary results if such a requirement violates the party’s
rules. 164
c. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut: Parties’ Rules
Prevail Against a State’s Primary Election Type
In 1984, the Republican Party of the State of Connecticut
adopted a rule permitting “independent voters—registered voters
not affiliated with any political party—to vote in Republican
primaries for federal and statewide offices.” 165 The State’s election
laws established a closed-primary system, and the
159. Id. at 124 (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).
160. Id. at 122.
161. Id. at 126.
162. Id. at 123–24.
163. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 125–26 (1981)
(holding that the Wisconsin laws unconstitutionally infringed on the Democrats’
freedom of association, and Wisconsin did not show a compelling state interest in
such infringement).
164. See id. at 126 (“The National Party rules do not forbid Wisconsin to
conduct an open primary. But if Wisconsin does open its primary, it cannot
require that Wisconsin delegates to the National Party Convention vote there in
accordance with the primary results, if to do so would violate Party rules.”).
165. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210 (1986).
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Democratic-controlled state legislature defeated Republican
lawmakers’ attempts to amend the state statute to allow for
independents to vote in primaries when permitted by party
rules. 166 In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 167 the
Court granted certiorari to consider whether the State’s
enforcement of the closed-primary law, which contradicted the
rules of the Republican Party, burdened the Republican Party’s
right to freedom of association.
The Court compared the conflicting rights and interests
between the State of Connecticut and the state Republican
Party. 168 Although the Court conceded the State’s constitutional
authority to administer elections, it said, “[T]his authority does not
extinguish the State’s responsibility to observe the limits
established by the First Amendment rights of the State’s
citizens.” 169 More specifically, the “power to regulate the time,
place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the
abridgment of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote . . . or,
as here, the freedom of political association.” 170 The Court
continued its tradition of reaffirming the freedom of association
possessed by partisan political organizations. 171 Citing Wisconsin,
the Court recognized that the freedom of association includes the
protection of a party’s interest of broadening its base of public
participation in and support for its activities. 172 Applying the strict
166. See id. at 212–13 (“The proposed legislation was defeated, substantially
along party lines, in both houses of the legislature, which at that time were
controlled by the Democratic Party”).
167. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986)
(holding that Connecticut’s closed primary statute interfered with a political
party’s right to define its associational boundaries).
168. See id. at 214–25 (balancing appellees’ interest in freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas against the state’s interest
in ensuring the primary system is administrable in preventing raiding, avoiding
voter confusion, and protecting the responsibility of party government).
169. Id. at 217.
170. Id. (citation omitted).
171. See id. at 214 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)) (“The
freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
includes partisan political organization.”).
172. See id. (explaining freedom of association). The Court explains:
The Party’s attempt to broaden the base of public participation in and
support for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the exercise
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scrutiny standard of review, the Court did not find any of the
interests proffered by the State to be compelling or the means of
preserving them—the closed primary—to be narrowly tailored. 173
The Court held “that the State’s enforcement, under these
circumstances, of its closed-primary system burdens the First
Amendment rights of the Party. The interests which the appellant
adduces in support of the statute are insubstantial, and
accordingly the statute, as applied to the Party in this case, is
unconstitutional.” 174 Tashjian does not represent the Court’s
repudiation of the closed primary but its disapproval of the State’s
administration of a more closed primary election despite a state
party’s preference for a more open primary election. Once again,
the party’s right to associate prevails against the State’s competing
interests. 175
d. California Democratic Party v. Jones: The State Cannot Force a
Party to Associate with Non-Members
In California Democratic Party v. Jones, 176 the Supreme Court
reviewed California’s Proposition 198, which in 1996 converted
California’s closed primary to the blanket primary. 177 The Court
reasoned that although the State has a “major role to play in
structuring and monitoring the election process,” elections are not
“wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely.” 178 In
contrast to this proposition, Justice Scalia, writing for the
of the right of association. As we have said, the freedom to join together
in furtherance of common political beliefs “necessarily presupposes the
freedom to identify the people who constitute the association.”

Id.
173. See id. at 217–25 (reviewing and rejecting each of the State’s compelling
interests).
174. Id. at 225.
175. See id. at 229 (“We conclude that § 9–431 impermissibly burdens the
rights of the Party and its members protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
176. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 589–90 (2000) (holding
that California’s blanket primary violated First Amendments rights of the
political parties).
177. See id. at 585–86 (explaining the changes California Proposition 198
made to the primary system).
178. Id. at 572–73.
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majority, emphasized that in “no area is the political association’s
right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its
nominee.” 179 The Court referenced its precedent, including
Tashjian and Wisconsin, and concluded: “California’s blanket
primary violates the principles set forth in these cases.” 180 More
specifically, the Court said that “Proposition 198 forces political
parties to associate with—to have their nominees, and hence their
positions, determined by—those who, at best, have refused to
affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated
with a rival.” 181
The Court invalidated California’s blanket primary, holding
that the State’s proffered interests were not compelling, and, even
if they were, a blanket primary was not narrowly tailored to
achieve those interests. 182 California Democratic Party v. Jones
represents the Court’s affirmation of the associational rights of
political parties, particularly when they come into conflict with a
state’s election regulations. 183 Essentially, a state’s primary
election scheme cannot force a party to associate with nonmembers. 184

179. Id. at 575.
180. Id. at 577.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 585 (“[W]e do not think that the State’s interest in assuring the
privacy of this piece of information in all cases can conceivably be considered a
“compelling” one . . . . [E]ven if all these state interests were compelling ones,
Proposition 198 is not a narrowly tailored means of furthering them.”).
183. See id. at 586 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S.
208, 216 (1986)) (explaining how California hindered party members’
constitutional right to select their political party members). The Court states:
Respondents’ legitimate state interests and petitioners’ First
Amendment rights are not inherently incompatible. To the extent they
are in this case, the State of California has made them so by forcing
political parties to associate with those who do not share their beliefs.
And it has done this at the “crucial juncture” at which party members
traditionally find their collective voice and select their spokesman.
Id.
184. See id. (discussing how the California law forced political parties to
associate with those who do not share their belief).
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4. The Resolution of the Conflict Between a Party and a Voter’s
Associational Rights
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Anderson v. Celebrezze 185
and Burdick v. Takushi 186 created the Court’s definitive test for
resolving constitutional challenges to a state’s election laws. 187 The
Court recognized that the fundamental rights of individuals to vote
in elections and associate with political parties inevitably conflict
with a state’s legitimate interest in regulating elections. 188 But the
Court also admitted the impossibility applying a “litmus paper
test” that could automatically resolve every constitutional
challenge to a state’s election laws. 189 So the Court articulated and
applied “a more flexible standard” that seeks to simultaneously
affirm the power of states “to regulate their own elections” while
recognizing that election laws “will invariably impose some burden
upon individual voters.” 190 Under this framework, a court hearing
claims against a state’s election laws must:
[F]irst consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
185. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (holding that the
burdens Ohio placed on the “voters’ freedom of choice and freedom of association,
in an election of nationwide importance, unquestionably outweigh the State’s
minimal interest in imposing a March deadline”).
186. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441–42 (1992) (holding that
“Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting, considered as part of an electoral scheme
that provides constitutionally sufficient ballot access, does not impose an
unconstitutional burden upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
State’s voters”).
187. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote—whether
it governs voter qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process—we use
the approach set out in Burdick . . . .”).
188. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (“Each provision of [the state’s election]
schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the
selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably
affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to
associate with others for political ends.”).
189. See id. at 789 (citations omitted) (“Constitutional challenges to specific
provisions of a State’s election laws therefore cannot be resolved by any
‘litmuspaper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restrictions. Instead, a
court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its
work in ordinary litigation.”).
190. Takushi, 504 U.S. at 433–34.
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Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary
to burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these
factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the
challenged provision is unconstitutional. 191

The Anderson/Burdick balancing test functions as a standard of
review from which the Court may apply varying levels of scrutiny
depending on the burden imposed by an election regulation and
the interests allegedly pursued by the State. 192 When First or
Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters are burdened by severe
restrictions, the Court applies a heightened standard of review
resembling strict scrutiny, which requires the challenged
regulation to be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance.” 193 In contrast, when a state’s election law
“imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,” the Court
applies a form of rational basis review, which means “‘the State’s
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’
these restrictions.”194
The Supreme Court has applied the Anderson/Burdick
analysis in resolving myriad election law disputes, including, but
not limited to, striking down filing deadlines for independent
candidates 195 and a closed-primary system contrary to the rules of

191. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
192. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“Under this standard,
the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends
upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.”).
193. See id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
194. See id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
195. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 805–06 (using the first formulation of the
Anderson/Burdick test to “conclude that Ohio’s March filing deadline for
independent candidates for the office of President of the United States cannot be
justified by the State’s asserted interest in protecting political stability”).
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a political party, 196 while upholding write-in vote bans, 197 fusion
candidates prohibitions, 198 and voter photo identification
requirements. 199 Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider
a constitutional challenge to a state’s law permitting party loyalty
pledges in an open primary, lower courts have applied the
Anderson/Burdick balancing test in upholding these types of
pledges as constitutional. 200
This Note argues that, although the Anderson/Burdick test is
the appropriate means by which to evaluate the constitutionality
of a party loyalty pledge in an open primary election, lower
courts—notably the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia in Parson—have misapplied the Anderson/Burdick test in
finding these party loyalty pledges to be constitutional. This Note
argues that an application of the test in accordance with the
analysis modeled by and standards established in Anderson would
likely—and ought to—render the opposite result.

196. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986)
(using the Anderson test to “conclude that the State’s enforcement . . . of its closed
primary system burdens the First Amendment rights of the Party. The interests
which the appellant adduces in support of the statute are insubstantial, and
accordingly the statute . . . is unconstitutional”).
197. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441 (applying the Anderson/Burdick test to
“conclude that when a State’s ballot access laws pass constitutional muster as
imposing only reasonable burdens on First and Fourth Amendment rights—as do
Hawaii’s election laws—a prohibition on write-in voting will be presumptively
valid . . . .”).
198. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 354 (1997)
(exercising the Anderson/Burdick test to evaluate Minnesota’s law prohibiting a
candidate from appearing on the ballot for more than one party and concluding
that “such a prohibition does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution”).
199. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008)
(employing the Anderson/Burdick test to conclude that the “state interests
identified as justifications for [Indiana’s voter photo identification law] are both
neutral and sufficiently strong to require us to reject petitioners’ facial attack on
the statute”).
200. See generally Jones v. Alabama, No. 00-0442, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3909
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 7, 2001) (dismissing plaintiff’s equal protection clause claim
because plaintiff did not show that there was a fundamental right to vote in a
primary encompassed in the fundamental right to vote in an election); see
generally Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479 (E.D. Va. 2016) (denying
plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction for a Virginia primary).
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IV. Argument

A. Independent Voters in Open Primaries Are a Protected Class of
Voters
In Parson, the Eastern District of Virginia invoked the
Anderson/Burdick framework to analyze the plaintiffs’ First and
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to Virginia’s statutory
provision allowing parties to use loyalty pledges in the
Commonwealth’s open primary elections, saying the test “applies
to all of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.” 201 The court divided its
analysis into three parts: First, the burden on the plaintiffs;
second, the State’s interests; third, the balancing of the two
aforementioned elements. 202
However, within the Anderson/Burdick framework, it is
imperative for a court to first identify who is burdened by a state’s
regulations before considering the nature of the burdens
imposed. 203 The Supreme Court in Anderson began its analysis by
identifying the class of voters whose fundamental rights were
burdened by the State’s election regulations; 204 in that case, it was
“an identifiable segment of Ohio’s independent-minded voters.” 205
In Parson, the District Court inferred that the plaintiffs’ alleged
an equal protection claim on behalf of African-American voters but
discounted the claim as unsubstantiated at worst or merely proof
of an unintended discriminatory impact at best. 206 What the
plaintiffs in Anderson succeeded in demonstrating—and what the
plaintiffs in Parson failed to argue—is the existence of another
201. Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 492 n.20.
202. Id. at 493–97.
203. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (“It must first
consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interest [of] the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”).
204. See id. at 792 (discussing the burden the March filing deadline has on
independents who decide to run after the deadline, independents who decide to
run before the deadline, and independent voters).
205. Id.
206. See Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 491 n.19 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(“Notwithstanding the speculative nature of this claim, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that proof of a discriminatory impact is not sufficient by itself to
prove an equal protection violation.”).
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identifiable class of voters possessing the fundamental rights to
vote and associate: “independent-minded voters.” 207 Although
unidentified and unconsidered in Parson, this segment of voters is
particularly and unreasonably targeted by party loyalty pledges in
open primary elections, which are in fact designed to accommodate
the freedom of association of independent and unregistered
voters. 208
B. Party Loyalty Pledges in Open Primaries Burden Independent
Voters’ Fundamental Liberties
In accordance with the Anderson/Burdick framework, the
Parson court first considered “the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments” that the plaintiffs sought to vindicate. 209 The court
correctly identified the right to vote and the freedom to associate
as fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 210 The court gave essentially two reasons why the
plaintiffs’ fundamental liberties were not severely burdened: First,
the court indicated that the voter’s right to vote and associate with
a political party in a primary election may not be as fundamental
or absolute as voting for or associating with a political party in a
general election; 211 second, the court categorized the plaintiffs’
three alleged burdens as speculative. 212
207. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790.
208. See id. (discussing the First Amendment rights of independent voters).
209. Parson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 493 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 789 (1983)).
210. See id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)) (“A voter’s right
to vote ‘is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.’”); see also id.
(quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)) (“The right to associate with
the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional
freedom [of the freedom to associate].”).
211. See id. at 493 n.22 (“That said, the Supreme Court seems to question
whether the right to vote in a primary is as fundamental as exercising that right
in a general election.”); see also id. at 493 (“The Supreme Court has neither
articulated, nor repudiated, a voter’s right not to associate with a political party.
However the Supreme Court has expressed that voters’ rights not to associate
with a party cannot trump, or even equal, a political party’s right not to associate
with some voters . . . .”).
212. See id. at 494–95 (indicating that the lack of sufficient evidence to prove
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The court concluded the latter for two primary reasons: First,
the court viewed the claims as speculative due to the plaintiffs’
failure to demonstrate substantial evidence in support of their
claims; 213 second, the court deemed the Republican Party’s loyalty
pledge to be legally unenforceable, citing Ray v. Blair 214 and Jones
v. Alabama, 215 and explaining that a “private, unenforceable
pledge does not pose a severe burden.” 216 The court admitted that
the plaintiffs’ claims of burden did not necessarily fail, but that
they lacked support particularly needed in a motion for
preliminary injunction. 217 The court’s conclusions of the sufficiency
of the evidence and efficacy of the pledge are likely accurate
considering this particular case’s claims and facts. But the
plaintiffs failed to argue, and the court neglected to analyze, a
severe burden present in this case and originally articulated in
Anderson on behalf its “identifiable segment of Ohio’s
independent-minded voters.” 218 It is a burden that, if identified,
would likely invalidate party loyalty pledges imposed in open
primary elections.
In Anderson, the Court affirmed that the rights at issue in that
case, and eventually at issue in Parson—the “right of individuals
to associate for the advancement of political beliefs” and “the right
of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast
their votes effectively”—are “among our most precious
freedoms.” 219 Like the court in Parson, the Anderson court
the plaintiffs’ contentions makes the claims speculative in nature).
213. See id. (responding to each of the plaintiffs’ three contentions as lacking
sufficient evidence to constitute proof of severe burdens).
214. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952) (holding that “the Twelfth
Amendment does not bar a political party form requiring the pledge to support
the nominees of the National Convention”).
215. See Jones v. Alabama, No. 00-0442-RV-L , 2001 WL 303533, at *2–6 (S.D.
Ala. Mar. 7, 2001) (holding that the Alabama Democratic Party’s party loyalty
pledge did not implicate fundamental rights and was substantially related to the
important state goal of reducing “raiding,” defined as when “those antipathetic to
a party nonetheless vote in its primary” in order to nominate a more vulnerable
general election candidate).
216. Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 494 (E.D. Va. 2016).
217. See id. at 495 (“Although Plaintiffs’ additional claims of burden do not
necessarily fail, they lack support at this stage of the proceedings.”).
218. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792 (1983).
219. Id. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968)).
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acknowledged that although “these rights of voters are
fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by States” also “impose
constitutionally suspect burdens on voters’ rights to associate or to
choose among candidates.” 220 Justifying the balancing test that
would eventually bear its name, the Anderson court admitted that
each provision of a state’s election code “inevitably affects—at least
to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to
associate with others for political ends.” 221 Despite this concession,
the court identified the fundamental right of “political
participation by an identifiable political group whose members
share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic
status.” 222 Although the court was speaking of a different issue—
candidates’ ballot access—party loyalty pledges have the same
effect on independent or unregistered voters in open primary
elections—they deny “the ‘disaffected’ not only a choice of
leadership but a choice on the issues as well.” 223
The Parson court found the burdens imposed by the
Republican Party of Virginia’s loyalty pledge on the plaintiffs’
associational and voting rights to be “neutral and reasonable.” 224
Contrary to the Parson court’s conclusion, the Anderson court’s
reasoning justifies the conclusion that the burden imposed on
independent or unregistered voters’ fundamental liberties by party
loyalty pledges in open primaries is severe. 225 To borrow the
language of Anderson: party loyalty pledges in open primary
elections inherently “operate as a mechanism to exclude certain
classes of candidates from the electoral process” 226 by forbidding
independent or unregistered voters to participate in a party’s
primary unless they effectively register as a member of that party
220. Id. at 788.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 793.
223. Id. at 792 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968)).
224. Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 497 (E.D. Va. 2016).
225. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94 (1983) (“A burden that
falls unequally on new or small political parties or on independent candidates
impinges, by its very nature, on associational choices protected by the First
Amendment. It discriminates against those candidates and—of particular
importance—against those voters whose political preferences lie outside the
existing political parties.”).
226. Id. at 793.
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by signing the pledge. A party loyalty pledge is a minimal burden,
if a burden at all, to a voter in a closed-primary system or to a voter
that already identifies as or is a registered member of the party in
an open-primary system. To borrow Anderson’s language again: A
party loyalty pledge “unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the
‘availability of political opportunity’” 227 of independent or
unregistered voters in open-primary systems. 228
This type of restriction is far from those that are “generally
applicable and evenhanded” that are upheld by the Court. 229
Similar to the filing deadline provision at issue in Anderson, party
loyalty pledges in open primaries limit the opportunities of
“independent-minded voters to associate in the electoral arena to
enhance their political effectiveness as a group.” 230 If that burden
was not severe enough alone, its effect is to “reduce diversity and
competition in the marketplace of ideas,” 231 which nullifies the
very purpose of primary elections.
C. Party Loyalty Pledges in Open Primaries Do Not Withstand
Strict Scrutiny
Because party loyalty pledges in open primaries are classbased—placing severe burdens on independent and unregistered
voters—it is necessary for parties wishing to impose such pledges
to satisfy strict scrutiny to pass the Anderson/Burdick test. 232 The
Parson court found the Republican Party of Virginia’s party loyalty
pledge only be a “reasonable, nondiscriminatory” restriction “upon
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters,” warranting
intermediate scrutiny, which allows for the State’s “important
regulatory interests” to be “generally sufficient to justify the
227. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 (quoting Clemens v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957,
964 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
228. See id. (highlighting that the burden falls unequally on new or small
political parties or on independent candidates).
229. Id. at 788 n.9.
230. Id. at 794.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 805–06 (using the first formulation of the Anderson/Burdick
test to “conclude that Ohio’s March filing deadline for independent candidates for
the office of President of the United States cannot be justified by the State’s
asserted interest in protecting political stability”).
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restrictions.” 233 However, as the Anderson comparison requires,
when “the plaintiffs’ rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance.” 234 Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether
(1) the state has a compelling interest in permitting or prescribing
party loyalty pledges in open primary elections; and, even if so,
whether (2) that regulation is narrowly drawn. 235
The state has no compelling interest for the enforcement of
party loyalty pledges in open primary elections. The Parson court
itself identified two interests offered by the Commonwealth of
Virginia in defense of the party loyalty pledge: “[F]irst, the
Commonwealth’s protection of the [Republican Party of Virginia]’s
own constitutional rights, and second, the state’s interest in the
order and integrity of the electoral process.” 236 Under an
intermediate scrutiny standard, the court found that these two
interests were important regulatory interests sufficient to justify
the party loyalty pledge within the open-primary scheme. 237
But in accordance with the strict scrutiny standard extracted
from the Anderson analysis, 238 even if these two interests were
compelling the enforcement of a party loyalty pledge in an
open-primary system is not a means sufficiently narrowly tailored
to further those interests. If the Republican Party of Virginia
wants to ensure that only true Republicans will participate in its
open primary, the most narrowly tailored approach the
Commonwealth of Virginia can take is to pursue a closed
primary—in which only registered voters may vote for their
parties—or a semi-closed primary—in which independents and
233. Parson v. Alcorn, 157 F. Supp. 3d 479, 492 (E.D. Va. 2016) (quoting
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
234. Id. (quoting Sarvis v. Judd, 80 F. Supp. 3d 692, 698 (E.D. Va. 2015)).
235. See generally Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
236. Id. at 496.
237. See id. at 492 (quoting Sarvis v. Judd, 80 F. Supp. 3d 692, 698 (E.D. Va.
2015)) (“[W]hen a state election law provision imposes only reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
of voters, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify the restrictions.”).
238. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792–93 (“As our cases have held, it is
especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits political
participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular
viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.”).

608

24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.563 (2018)

unregistered voters may participate in the primary of the party of
their choice. 239 The Supreme Court in Nader v. Schaffer already
upheld this closed-primary approach as constitutional, as explored
above. 240
Until the Republican Party of Virginia pushes for reform of the
Commonwealth’s primary election scheme, it cannot have it both
ways: attempting to mitigate the risks of an open primary by
enforcing a party loyalty pledge— and reaping all the rewards of
an open primary—at the cost of the associational rights of
independent voters. This practice does nothing more than
disenfranchise an entire segment of the voting population that is
not required by the Commonwealth to register by party in order to
vote in its presidential primary.
V. Conclusion
The Eastern District of Virginia incorrectly applied
Anderson/Burdick framework to decide Parson. A clearer reading
and application of the Anderson/Burdick test in Parson would
likely lead to the opposite result. Fundamentally, the court failed
to identify the class of independent voters in Virginia’s
open-primary system. These voters’ associational rights were
impermissibly burdened by Virginia’s statutory scheme and the
state Republican Party’s use of a party loyalty pledge, which
constituted state action subject to constitutional review.
The theory and case law indicate that party loyalty pledges in
open primaries constitute state action that impermissibly burdens
a protected class of independent voters’ freedom of association.
These pledges are not narrowly tailored means to further any of
the State’s compelling interests, particularly when applied in
primary election schemes that promote voters’ independence. And
every effort by parties or states to limit the associational rights of
independent voters in open primary elections should be deemed
unconstitutional. If a class of independent voters is more clearly
239. See id. (discussing how placing unequal burdens on small or independent
political classes impinges on the First Amendment protections of the freedom to
associate).
240. Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 850 (D. Conn. 1976), summarily
aff’d, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
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and readily identified in open-primary states that allow—or have
parties that mandate—party loyalty pledges, future cases and
controversies on the conflict of associational rights between parties
and independent voters may lead to that very result.
It is time to reclaim the First Amendment associational rights
of independent voters in open-primary states. Independent voters
in open-primary states do not owe allegiance to any political party.
They ought not be required to pledge it.

